Volume 72
Issue 1 Issues 1 & 2

Article 3

February 1970

What Has the Supreme Court Taught: A Criticism of the Unites
States Supreme Court by Way of a Critique of Lance v. the Board
of Education of Roane County
James Audley McLaughlin
West Virginia University College of Law, james.mclaughlin@mail.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
James A. McLaughlin, What Has the Supreme Court Taught: A Criticism of the Unites States Supreme
Court by Way of a Critique of Lance v. the Board of Education of Roane County, 72 W. Va. L. Rev. (1970).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught: A Criticism of the Unites Stat

West Virginia Law Review
Volume 72

December - February 1969-70

Numbers 1 & 2

WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT?
A criticism of the United States Supreme Court by
way of a critique of Lance v. The Board of Education of Roane County.
James Audley McLaughlin*
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example.'
The subway fare in New York City was recently raised to
thirty cents. Incensed citizens immediately declared they would go
to court and have the increase declared unconstitutional2 "Unconstitutional" and "constitutional rights" have become the watchwords of political protestors and reformers. Moreover, their political forum is often a court of law. Who taught the nation this
rhetoric, this mode of action, and this attitude toward law, law
reform, and politics? The Supreme Court of the United States. Has
the Court deliberately taught this doctrine? No, nor is it apparently
even conscious of what it has unwittingly done.
It is important to remember that, the Court is, was intended to
be, and ought to be an important, even vital, teacher in our democracy. 3 However, this traditional "teaching"I is a conscious attribute
of its great power of judicial review - the power to review and
override in the name of the Constitution some decisions of those
branches of government representing the immediate will of the
people. But in a subter more pervasive and ultimately more potent
OAssistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; BA.
1962, Ohio State University; J.D., 1965, Ohio State University.
'Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1970, at 37, col. 5 (city ed.).
'In Judge Wyzanski's felicitious phrase the Court is "teacher to citizenry."
Wyzanski, Constitutionalism; Limitation and Affirmation, in GOVmmMENT UNDER LAw 473, 485-486 (A. Sutherland ed. 1956).
'For a discussion of the general history, probable "original intent" of the
framers, and early practice of this judicial function see, Lerner, The Supreme
Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967, SuPRmtE COURT RniV 127.
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manner, the Court, like the political branches Justice Brandeis was
speaking of, teaches by its example. This example is the Courts'
activity seen as a whole, that is as the publicly-visible pattern of its
more salient holdings, rather than as fragmented into individual
holdings or their rationale. By this example the Court teaches attitude toward the idea of law in a constitutional democracy. By
this example it teaches the lower courts their role as decision makers in a democracy. It teaches political leaders their role in constitutional policy making, i.e. in policy touching the heart of what we
are as a people. And it teaches all of us whom we must persuade if
desired policy is to be realized.
Part I of this article examines in detail one particular result of
the Supreme Court's teaching - a recent constitutional decision by
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. In Part II** of this
article, a more general examination of the Court's recent activity, is
undertaken in order to develop the thesis suggested by the critique
of the West Virginia case that the tone set by the example of the
Court of the recent past is inimical to both the vital function of the
Court as a guardian-teacher of fundamental American ideals and to
the political health of a democracy.

Lance v. Board of Education of Roane County'
In 1966, the people of West Virginia were asked (by referendum) to amend the state constitution in order to allow local taxing units to lift the constitutional maximum limits on ad valorem
property taxes by simple majority vote of its electors instead of by
a 60% majority vote.6 Similarly, West Virginians were asked to
amend the constitution in order to allow local units to incur bonded indebtedness redeemable from property taxes by simple majority
instead of by a three-fifths majority. 7 Both amendments were offered
to facilitate taxing to support public schools. This was to most a
laudable purpose and to many these were wise amendments." Some,

"Part II will appear in the spring edition of the Law Review.
-170 S.E. 2d (W. Va. 1969).
'W. VA. CONSr. art. X., § § I and 10.

'W. VA. COrDsT. art., § § 8 and 10.
'Judge Haymond in dissent in Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d
783, 796 (W. Va. 1969) stated: "I favor alL possiblo and proper aid to
education and, if I had been eligible to vote in Roane County, I would have
voted to authorize the issuance of the bonds .... 1"
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however, have criticized property taxes as an unfair and even as a
regressive form of raising revenues. 9 The people of West Virginia
chose not to adopt the amendments by a majority of 6341.10
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia at the
behest of several litigants ordered such 60% majority limitations
out of the constitution, in effect amending the constitution to allow
what the people had recently said they would not allow."
AND How SHOULD TmY PESUmE?
How could a court of law, a judicial tribunal, presume to rewrite, contrary to the polity's recently manifested will, the law
as to how and when certain nondiscriminatory taxes which the
people must pay, will be levied? The court "presumed" because it
felt authorized, even compelled, by certain recent United States
Supreme Court decisions that held that suits to compel states to
reapportion their legislatures on a basis more compatable with
equal representation of population were fit for federal courts to
decide. 12 Since the West Virginia court decided on the merits that
this suit was analogous to the reapportionment cases and therefore
controlled by them, it gave cavalier treatment to the threshold question of justiciability. Thus the Supreme Court had taught them to
presume. But even assuming that Baker v. Carr'3 and progeny are
analogous to Lance on the merits, certain palpable surface differences 14 might have alerted the court to examine more carefully the
much criticized Baker mutation of the political question doctrine
that had before Baker prevented federal courts from hearing such
suits.' 5
In the first place, Lance was not a federal case, and although
the Supreme Court has generally admonished state courts to lend a
'Philipps, The West Virginia Constitution and Taxation, 71 W. VA. L. REv.
260 (1969).
"Lance v. Board of Education 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969) (Haymond, J.,
dissenting).
'Lance v. Board of Education 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533 (1964);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"By "surface differences" is meant differences that are plain on the face of
the case without probing extensively into the merits. The phrase is not synonomous with superficial differences. Rather, surface differences are those that
are plain, palpable, salient - those that a layman would immediately see but that
a lawyer schooled in the subtle art of analogical thinking might pass over as
merely superficial.
'See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950y; Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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hand in the surprisingly successful experiment of reapportionment,
it did not thereby convert a principle of federal court jurisdiction, or
the proper exercise thereof, into one controlling state court jurisdiction. That question is one solely for the state court to decide.'
The declination of jurisdiction would not have prevented federal
court adjudication but it might have put the case in a different pos7
ture when and if it ultimately reached the Supreme Court."
Second, and more to the merits of the justiciability or "political
question" issue, is the distinct difference between Baker and Lance.
In Baker v. Carr the constitutional challenge was to the very integrity of the political process. Tennessee had not reapportioned in
60 years despite the command of the Tennessee constitution, nor
did it appear likely that legislators would destroy their own seats to
effect this reform. Rural areas dominated the legislature of Tenn-

"See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
"If the West Virginia Court of Appeals had refused to find the suit judidally cognizable in the West Virginia courts, an appeal could have been had
to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) (1948). But since such
decision would manifestly rest on a non-federal ground, the Supreme Court
under its rule in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)
would not decide the federal claim unless it found the asserted state ground
of decision "inadequate." See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). Among
the several tests for this, the one most likely applicable to the Lance case
would be whether the decision was consistent with prior state decisions or
simply a means of avoiding giving remedy to asserted federal rights. Woods v.
Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 249 U.S.
490 (1919). If it found such ground inadequate, the Court would probably proceed to decide the asserted federal claim, including its justiciability. (But a
finding of inadequacy would in this context be tantamount to a finding of federal court justiciability.) Whether the Court could then remove to the state
court to enforce a decree which the state court had declared it was without
authority under state law to enforce is doubtful. It could probably do so
only on the ground that the state court denial of a remedy was itself a violation
of due process. Brinkerfroff-Faris Trust and Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
On the other hand, if the U.S. Supreme Court now decides that the claim in
Lance is not justiciable under federal doctrine, it will either deny certiorari or
having granted certiorari dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. In either
event, the decision in Lance will stand. See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 429 (1952). However, another possibility is available to the Court. Since it
declared in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), that nonjusticiability as a
political question was not a jurisdictional question (as standing had been in
Doremus), it might proceed to the merits of the state court decision, which was
based squarely on federal law, despite reservations as to its justiciability as a
matter of original federal court cognizance. It could thus correct the erroneous
reading of the "one man, one vote" rule.
The procedural problems raised by the West Virginia court's rush to
judgment are only suggested here. A full treatment is outside the scope of this
article. See Note, The Untenable Non-Federal Ground in the Supreme Court,
74 HARv. L. REv. 1375 (1961).
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essee despite the large numerical superiority of the urban areas.i s
This was part of a nationwide problem - an old problem that the
political process itself showed no signs of abatingj9 It was of such
fundamental concern that the Solicitor General of the United States
entered the case as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and it was
his argument that dominated the Court's opinion.-s
In brief, Baker v. Carrwas an effort to break a logjam in the
fundamental political process that time and the nature of the
problem had shown could not be broken by the political process
itself. The dynamite of judicial review could, by ignoring in this
instance the damper of its well considered political question doctrine, make the political process more responsible and responsive.
In fact, early, too sanguine, commentators suggested that the one
blast of Baker v. Carr would itself sufficiently weaken the jam so
2
that the pressure of the river of public opinion would clear it away. '
It took more judicial dynamite than Baker. But the political process has now been reinvigorated and renovated. Now, ironically,
Baker should become, not an excuse for intervention, but rather
a reason for a greater deference to such newly-responsive political
process, giving greater plausibility to the political question excuse
for refusing jurisdiction.
In Lance, on the other hand, none of these demands for court
intervention were present. The political process was quite healthy.
The constitution could be amended by a bare majority. A constitu"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 188-193; see also concurring opinion of Dougglas, 19J., at 248 and Clark, J., at 258-259.
Id. at 248 n.4. For an early apportionment case see State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). In Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) the Court cites authority to the effect that proper apportionment was a major concern as early as the Constitution itself. Id. at 564 nAl
and at 578 n.55.
'Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, in THE Sum amCOURT AND
THE CONSTITUTION, 187 at 195 (1965).
'See Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. REv. 829
(1962) where at 832, the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States
characterized the Court's decision as a "call for action" to the states to put their
own houses in order. A. Bickel, Tm LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCHI 196 (1962) states:
The decision in Baker v. Carr may thus be read as holding no more than
that, Tennessee having last been malapportioned sixty years ago, the
situation there is the result, not of a deliberate if imperfect present judgment of the political institutions, but merely of inertia and oligarchic
entrenchment. . . * [T]he principled goal of equal protection had

enough vitality to enable the court to prod the Tennessee political
institutions into action.... The judgement in Baker 'v. Carr is likely to
generate effective pressure for legislative action ....
Once a new apportionment statute had been passed, curing the situation in some degree,
there will be little more that the judicial process can or should do....
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tional amendment had recently been offered to the voters and
rejected. There was absolutely no logjam in the political process
except perhaps in the way the constitutional amendments were
proposed2 or in what some may have thought was the obstinacy of
the voters. Surely no court can enjoin the amendment-proposers to
be good tacticians or the voters to be wiser. The West Virginia
legislature was reapportioned in 1964 - with the help of the West
Virginia Supreme Court23 - to reflect the population of West Virginia as accurately as is possible, consistent with not destroying
county units and not opening the way to wholesale gerrymandering.24 This probably was in response to Baker v. Carr,which may be
partial vindication of those generally too sanguine views that "one
blast" would do it.25
Admittedly the United States Supreme Court has obfuscated
this clear difference which is apparent when viewing Baker and
Lance in isolation. Between Baker and Lance are many decisions,
which plunge inexorably forward seeking manageable standards
of apportionment with hardly a look back 2 to Baker v. Carr. Even
in Avery v. Midland County,27 where the Court took a long leap
forward (or backward) by extending Reynolds v. Sims to local
government units, the majority of five2s made only oblique reference to Baker v. Carr and then not to its justiciability holding.2 9
And this singularly unprophetic advice is given by Bickel at 195: "Urban voters
will be snatching defeat from the jaws of victory if they now concentrate all
their energies on law suits and focus their hopes of ultimate success on the
judiciary." See also McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. Rv.
54 (1962) and Edwards, Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of Reapportionment and Redistricting: With Reference to Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L. Rav. 1265
(1962).
'See generally, Symposium on Constitutional Revision, 71 W. VA. L. Rav.
237 (1969).
-'Robertson v. Hatcher, 148 W. VA. 239, 135 S.E. 2d 675 (1964).
'Apparently the present apportionment still would not satify the punctilio
with which mathematical equality is required by recent Supreme Court decisions.
See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Note, West Virginia Apportionment
of 1964 - Constitutional? 71 W. VA. L. REv. 171 (1969). Cf. Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler,
394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
2
5See note 21 supra.
'In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 553 (1964), the Court did note that, "No
effective political remedy to obtain relief against the alleged malapportionmeat of the Alabama Legislature appears to have been available." This is also
noted in Reynolds v. Sims, supra at 570. But see Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
=390 U.S. 474 (1968).
The Chief Justice and Justices White, Black, Douglas and Brennan;
Justices Harlan, Stewart and Fortas dissented, Justice Marshall not participating.
"Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479 n.4 (1968).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/3

6

McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught: A Criticism of the Unites Stat
1970] WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT?

7

Only Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice
Stewart, saw the justiciability issue as raised again. He stated:
At the present juncture I content myself with stating two
propositions which, in my view, stand strongly against what
is done today. The first is that the "practical necessities"
which have been thought by some to justify the profound
break with history that was made in 1962 by this Court's
decision in Baker v. Carr.. ., are not present here. .... 0
But Harlan did not press the issue further in his opinion. However
the majority did make the following assertion which was no doubt
partially in response to Harlan's above quoted objection;
That the state legislature may itself be properly apportioned does not exempt subdivisions from the Fourteenth
Amendment. While state legislatures exercise extensive
power over their constituents and over the various units of
local government, the States universally leave much policy
and decisionmaking to their governmental subdivisions.
Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach
those countless matters of local concern necessarily left
wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level.
What is more, in providing for the governments of their
cities, counties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provide for representative government - for decisionmaking at the local level by representatives elected by
the people. And, not infrequently, the delegation of power
to local home rule which are immune from legislative interference.31
This statement certainly indicates that the Court felt that the political process could not be responsive to the problem of local malapportionment because of incrusted constitutional limitations on
the power of legislatures to act with regard to local government.
Thus, a close reading of the cases following Baker and examination
of their underlying facts may have alerted the West Virginia court
to the continuing plausibility of reading Baker as a "practical necessities" exception to a still vigorous political question doctrine. At
least for purposes of determining whether to adopt and adapt the
1ld. at 488.
1ld. at 481.
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federal remedial procedure as the state's own, a fresh look at the
problem was indicated.
Perhaps, too, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
should have taken Justice Frankfurter's sage advice given in dissent in Baker to avoid the "danger of conceptions of 'justiciability'2
derived from talk and not from the effective decision in a case."B
For the Court in Baker strained to announce in "neutral principles" 33 a rule arrived at for "prudential" reasons.3 4 Such "strain"
produced all the "talk" which obscured the basically prudential
reasons for judicial intervention - the practical necessity of breaking the logjam.
In no federal case had it been held that the unfairness of the
size of the majority required for an election was a judicially cognizable issue. All of the decisions following Baker involved holding an
apportionment scheme unfair in some context. Desire to appear
"neutral" and "principled" may well have swept the Court along
on any reapportionment case, brushing aside Harlan's suggestion
in Avery that the Court now acknowledge the prudential nature of
the Baker decision. But in Lance, even assuming that the principle
of "one man, one vote" applied, the strikingly different context of
its application to voting on laws as opposed to voting for officials
should have given the West Virginia court an excuse for an "out"
on principled grounds from the Supreme Court's prudential ruling
in Baker.
Assuming again that the "one man, one vote" standard can be
logically extended to Lance, another surface difference between
Baker and Lance is in the nature of the basis for standing in the
two cases. In Baker, the plaintiffs were objectively identifiable as
members of a class whose rights plaintiffs sought to vindicate. Then
insofar as they were members of such prejudiced class, they were
individually prejudiced - i.e. showed "disadvantage to themselves
as individuals."3 5 As a general rule in equal protection cases one
must be a member of the class discriminated against in order to
have standing to sue.30 And if all the cases prior to and cited in

'Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 285 (1962).
'See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
'See Bickel, supra, note 21, at 132-13-3.
'Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186, 206 (1962).
"Jeffrey Mfg., Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915); cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346

Us. 249 (1953).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/3

8

McLaughlin: What Has the Supreme Court Taught: A Criticism of the Unites Stat
1970] WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT TAUGHT?

9

Baker to support standing in an equal protection context are examined, one finds that the plaintiffs were all members of objectively
identifiable classes..3 Where an individual is allowed to sue as a
"citizen or taxpayer," rights other than equal protection rights were
claimed violated. 8
Since Lance was an equal protection case, 39 standing could
not be maintained merely as "taxpayers, citizens, and qualified electors" but paradoxically that was the plaintiffs' only plausible basis.
For in Lance there was no objectively identifiable class that the
plaintiffs were members of. The plaintiffs could not be identified by
where they lived, by their race, or even by their political party (as in

'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207 n.28 (1962) lists some of the cases. Matthews
v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959), which is cited in the footnote, affirmed on motion
an order by a three judge district court dismissing a citizens' suit in a reappor
tionment case, but the plea for relief was the injunction of a gross income tax on
the basis that the tax was passed by a malapportioned legislature. Neither the
district court nor the Supreme Court mentions standing. It was dismissed as a
nonjusticiable political question. However, the nature of the case does suggest
that plaintiffs sought standing merely as taxpayers and citizens since they were
seeking to enjoin tax collection. Which constitutional right was claimed violated
is not made clear. It was most likely due process on the theory that the legislature, having disobeyed the positive command to reapportion contained in the
constitution that created it, was no longer a lawful body and its acts were
simply of no effect. Thus, even if standing was sub silentio recognized in
taxpayers, it was in due process taxpayer's suit and not an equal protection
suit. Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ind. 1959).
'For example Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932) interpreted the Reapportionment Act of 1911 at the behest of a citizen, elector, and qualified candidate. (Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone and Roberts, J.J. concurred on basis of want of
equity.) See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (citizen and taxpayer allowed
standing in Establishment Clause suit) and compare with Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923). Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932) reversing 184 Minn.
228, 238 N.W. 494 (1931) [cited in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 n. 26 (1962)]
was a case involving the meaning of the word "Legislature" in art. I, § 4 of the
Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of Minnesota had said that
it meant the body of men called the legislature. Thus a governor's veto could not
override that body's power as granted in art. I, § 4. The United States Supreme
Court said it meant the sum total of those people who have the legislative power
of the state - which would include the governor's veto. The suit was brought
by a "citizen, taxpayer, and elector.' His standing was assumed (without consideration) by the Minnesota court. Thus had the Supreme Court reviewed standing as an independent federal issue as in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 429 (1952) and found it wanting, it would have allowed to stand an
erroneous interpretation of specific language of the constitution (at odds with
another state's interpretation) which could have only one of two meanings. Its
duty to make clear once and for all the correct interpretation of a precise
word affecting federal elections was manifest. The decision was unanimous and
did not even mention standing.
ntance v. Board of Education 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969) (paragraph a of
syllabus by court).
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the Progressive Party Case) ,40 the latter being somewhat more difficult to identify objectively than any other group so far recognized.
The plaintiffs did claim in their brief to have been "active in support
of the efforts of the Board to provide additional local revenues to
meet the requirements of the county educational system, contributing
their time, efforts and resources . .."- This has some of the attributes of a political party. However, plaintiffs did not rely on this
for standing, 42 nor did the court find this to be the group they
could be identified with,43 nor would it have been sufficient if they
had. For such a loose-knit, informal collection of workers for a
common single political purpose had none of those attributes which
make a political party an objectively identifiable class. In MacDougall v. Green44 the organization membership and voter registration lists gave some means of identifying the individuals composing
the class other than such individuals' absolutely unverifiable sayso as to their votes or their political convictions.
The class, membership in which plaintiffs did rely for standing, cannot be identified objectively, because the only evidence of
membership in it is their word as to a vote secretly cast and now
beyond identification with the voter casting it. In order to get an
objectively identifiable class an unveiling of the secret vote would be
necessary - a calling forth of all to cast their vote publicly - an overturning of a most sacred and personal right.4 5 If this is thought to be
mere captiousness, ask yourself if the intervenors and true adversaries (for the nominal defendants - the school board - had proposed tihe very tax levies defeated) were not forced to cast their votes
4
publicly in order to intervene and claim what they felt was justice. 6

"MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S.281 (1948); again if a finding of standing
there was, it was sub silento. See also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
'Brief of Appellants at 5, Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W.
Va. 1969).
"Id. at 2. Appellants do claim to be "citizens, taxpayers, and qualified" voters
of Roane County. But at 14, appellants asserted "Every one of the Supreme
Court cases cited above has affirmatively sustained the right of appellants to
sue for themselves and on behalf of all others voting with the majority at the
April 29, 1968, elections."
4'Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).

"335 U. 281 (1948).

"See State ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey, 164 S.E. 2d 414 (W. Va. 1968);
71 W. VA. L. Rxv. 416 (1969).
"The intervenors claimed standing merely as "qualified voters and taxpayers of Roane County, West Virginia, whose personal and property interests
are directly affected by this proceeding." Brief in Support of Motion for Leave
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Moreover, if in order to get an identifiable group, the votes must
be cast publicly - must both the vote on the tax bond levy and on
the 1967 constitutional amendment to eliminate the 60% requirement be so cast? And is it not pure conjecture to say that no one
of the 52% majority*- for the tax levy did not also vote to retain the
60% requirement? In other words, some probably voted for passage
of the tax levy who did not wish the levy passed unless at least 60%
approved. And that was the condition of the balloting when they cast
their votes. The court's decision not only changed the outcome,
it changed retroactively what the people voted for.
Moreover, the Lance decision is awash with the implication that
nominal defendants cannot supply that "concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentations of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional question." 4 8 This is another aspect of the standing requirement - to
avoid "friendly, nonadversary proceedings" and here the defen-

to Intervene and for Rehearing at 1, Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d 78
(W. Va. 1969). But as a practical matter have they not made manifest, by going.
to the trouble of intervening, how they in fact voted? Assuming they are
hardy men willing to so cast their apparent vote publicly, the point is they
had an absolute right conferred by the secret ballot to keep that political choice
private. That right they were effectively forced to abandon in order to protect that vote by intervening.
Moreover, as to the intervenor's standing, plaintiff asserted, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Authorities In Opposition to Motion. to Intevene and for Rehearing,
Lance v. Board of Education, supra:
It is difficult to determine just what interest the movants have in these
proceedings. They do not allege that they voted in the elections in question or how they voted, nor do they allege any other interest which would
give them a right to intervene. This case involves only the voting rights
of the individuals who voted at the election; and the interest of the
movants as taxpayers and citizens are insufficient to give them the
right to intervene.
It is dear from this that plaintiffs did predicate their standing on being
members of the "class" of majority voters for the tax levy, although they
stated in their Brief that they were "citizens, taxpayers and qualified voters
of Roane County." See notes 41 and 52 supra.It is also clear that at least plaintiffs'
idea was that the intervenors must reveal their vote in order to have standing
to intervene.
"'Brief of Appellant at 6, Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d 788 (W.
Va. 1969).
4"Baker v. Carr, 869 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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dants'obvious interest in getting more money to build schools makes
49
them highly suspect as real opponents, to say the least.
Even in reapportionment cases, the official defendants have in
a number of cases declined to defend, or have even joined in plaintiffs prayer for invalidation.- In some, but not all of such cases, the
defense has been assumed by intervenors. 51 But the intervenors
did not have to reveal a vote secretly cast or make public a political
position privately held in order to intervene.
Finally, it should be added that no court has heretofore even
discussed the idea that a class must be "objectively ascertainable"
but then no such "class" as here represented has ever sought equal
protection vindication.
The whole point is that these palpable differences in the nature of the political question involved and the standing alleged as
between Lance and Baker should have alerted the court to make
careful inquiry of these matters before extending the equity jurisdiction of the West Virginia court.52 Why they did not was caused,
I believe, by the example set by the U.S. Supreme Court - its loose
language, its effort to find a principled basis for an essentially prudential decision and the natural confusion engendered by its wrench-

'On the subject of collusive suits see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 502
(1943). In Lord v. Veazie, 49 US. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850), Chief Justice Taney
explained the difference between amicable suits and ones lacking true controversy:
[In some cases] for the purposes of obtaining a decision of the controversy,
without incurring needless expense and trouble, [the parties] agree to
conduct the suit in an amicable manner. . . . But there must be an
actual controversy, and adverse interests. The amity consists in the
manner in which it is brought to issue before the court. And such amicable actions, so far from being objects of censure, are always approved
and encouraged, because they facilitate greatly the administration of
justice between parties. The objection in the case before us is, not that
the proceedings were amicable, but that there is no real conflict of
interest between them; that the plaintiff and defendant have the same
third persons, whose rights would be seriously affected if the question of
law was decided in the manner that both of the parties to this suit
desire it to be.
'Neal, supra, note 20 at 208 n.71.
"See, e.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
'The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cited only Nuckols v. Athey,
149 W.Va. 40, 138 S.E. 2d 44 (1964), as authority for the extension of a declaratory judgment remedy to the Lance case. Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d
783 (W. Va. 1969). The Nuchols case was a typical declaratory judgment suit without political question or standing problems. The rest of the authority was borrowed
from federal law. But, as pointed out above, this federal law has now become
state law and the fact can be decisive in the disposition of the case made by the
United States Supreme Court.
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ing the judiciary out of its traditional passive role and thrusting
it into the "political thicket" without holdings that limit this new
activist role.
The reapportionment cases are really only a part of the pattern.
But before discussing that pattern, it is necessary to discuss "one
man, one vote", which was jerked from its original context in-reapportionment and election-of-officials cases to do service in Lance.
This standard, it should first be pointed out, evolved out of cases
following Baker in which the Court tried frantically to fulfill the
bland assurance of Baker that the subject matter of reapportionment
was amenable to "judically discoverable and manageable standards"
of resolution. 53 Finally, they reached a standard so simple that one
dissenting member of the Court has characterized it as a resolution
"in terms of sixth grade arithmetic." 54
AND WHAT DID

THEY AssuME?

Weighting Votes and Majority Rule
In Lance v. Board of Education of Roane County, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals assumed two things about the
"one man, one vote" rule as enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims.r'5 First,

it assumed that the rule could be applied out of the context of legislative reapportionment and out of the context of state elections relying respectly on Gray v. Sanderse and Avery v. Midland
County. 7 Second, it assumed that the peoples' having adopted the
measure by statewide referendum was no defense to a deviation from
the "one man, one vote" principle. 5
From this they deduced that the right was a personal voting
right that obtained in a county election despite the approval in
1966 by a majority of the people of the state of the "violation" of
the "right". And none of this is inconsistent with the "one man, one
vote" rule of Reynolds and progeny. But the Court had to make a
further step. It seemed simple. Since the Supreme Court had said as
a corollary to the "one man, one vote" rule that votes cannot be

'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

"Avery v. Midland County, 390 US. 474,510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
-372 U.S. 368 (1963).

390 U.S. 474 (1968).

"Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
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"weighted" differently,? the West Virginia court deduced that any
referendum election that required anything other than simple
majority for passage of the proposed measure was a weighting of
votes and thus unconstitutional. The reasoning goes like this: When
there is a requirement of 60% majority for passage, that means that
60 "for" votes exactly balance 40 "against" votes. Now assuming an
ordinary balance (like one for weighing physical objects) simple
arithmetic tells one that if the scale is in balance when 60 things
are one one side and 40 on the other then each of the "things" on
the 60 side must "weigh" (assuming all "things" on one side are
equal) two-thirds as much as each "thing" on the other side.
Or put variously the ratio of the weight of each unit on the 60 side to
each unit on the 40 side is as I to 1 1/2. If the 60 side is labeled "for"
and the 40 side labeled "against", with Lance claiming he cast one of
the votes "for", then since it weighed only two-thirds what an
"against" vote weighed, his personal right to an equally weighted
vote was violated. And if further assurance is needed did not the
United States Supreme Court use the very word "weight" five times
in its opinion in Gray v. Sanders0 and many times since?
Logical? Simple? Obvious? Of course, overwhelmingly so - a
child could see it. But wait, is there not still a lingering doubt?
Could it be that voting for officials is different from voting for
tax laws? Not necessarily, as will be pointed out below. But an assumption was made in the reasoning posited above, and that assumption is the very conclusion reached. That assumption was that
i'one man, one vote" demands simple majority rule. By using the
analogy of the "balance", where one extra increment of weight on
either side tips the scale, one has assumed the simple majority principle where one extra vote on either side tips the election. But that
is the very question asked - a classic example of petitio principii.
Was the United States Supreme Court also guilty of such logical fallacy? No. But what they did by not stating this premise and by
using the word "weight" was apparently very misleading. For
"weight" necessarily implies a scales and when the weighing is of
one thing against another, it necessarily implies a balance. But in

'E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
1372 US. 368, 374 (once), 379 (twice), 380 (twice) (1963). Justice Harlan
in dissent uses "weighted" three times and "diluting" twice to characterize the
majority rule.
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the Supreme Court cases the premise of majority rule was a "given"
in each case. That is, in electing a primary candidate in Gray, simple majority rule was the test set up by Georgia. In the legislative
reapportionment cases the ultimate thing "elected" is the legislation, i.e., the laws passed by the legislature, state or local. (This will
be explained below as another necessary underlying premise of the
reapportionment cases. This also makes for some confusion since it
is unstated; but, the Court's reticence in this regard can be explained). And in the overwhelming number of cases this legislation is
created by a simple majority of the legislative body. Thus in all
cases decided up to now by the Supreme Court, simple majority was
assumed as a premise, not because simple majority must be taken,
a priori, as the only just principle, but rather it was assumed bcause it was factually true. When the rule was formulated in terms
of weight, simple majority was a necessary premise, but that did not
necessarily make it the only true principle; it was simply a given
fact. The complete formulation of the rule in Gray v. Sanders is:
Given simple majority rule, all votes must be weighted equally.
Moreover, it is safe to say that as a matter of fact simple majority
is generally considered the fairest way to decide issues in a democratic society. One class of issues can be decided only by simple majority to be consistent with the ideal of fairness fundamental to a
"scheme of ordered liberty". However, another class of issues can
be decided by either simple majority or by a super majority and
remain consistent with the ideal of fundamental fairness. The real
question in Lance was determining which kind of issue was before
the voters and further, if it was of the latter class, the question was:
Was the 607 requirement under all the particular circumstances
consistent with that fundamental fairness which is due process?
The first class of issues, that which can be decided only by
simple majority, is one in which the choice is between two (or more)
alternatives, one of which must be taken, as there will be nothing to
fatl back on if the choice is not made. The typical example is the
election of people to office. Assume, as is typical, that A holds the
office at election time but his term automatically expires by law on
January 1. A and B are both candidates for the office commencing January 1. If neither is elected then the office is left vacant.
Assuming that such vacancy could not be tolerated (e.g., the office
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of president, governor, senator, congressman, mayor, etc.),01 then
a choice must be made. Then given the assumption that one man is
as good as another in legal contemplation - certainly a fundamental
American ideal - the only fair way to determine as between A and B
is by counting the individual choices and giving office to the one
who is chosen by the most people - a simple majority. In the case
of more than two candidates a simple plurality will often be tolerated
because of the need to fill the office.
Moreover, some lawmaking is of this variety. Take for example,
a tax levy or appropriation, which furnishes the sole support of a
vital governmental function, such as public schools, but which automatically expires as of a certain date. The voters are given a choice
of one of two new tax levies to begin at the expiration of the old.
No taxes would mean no revenue and no revenue would be the
end of the vital governmental function, which termination is intolerable. If the choices are labeled A and B, then, since one must prevail, the rejection of A is automatically the choice of B, and B is not
simply "not A." The latter fact is most significant. For "not A" is
here simply no tax at all and that, as said, is intolerable.
If tax "A" could not become law unless 60% of the people approved of it that would mean tax "B" would become law if preferred by only 41% of the people. It needs no elaboration to conclude that almost anyone would see that as fundamentally unfair.
It is certainly inconsistent with the ideal of government by the will
of the people, assuming all men are equal in legal contemplation.
The fundamental indicia of the first class of issues, then, are
that (1) a choice must be made (2) between two or more new
courses of action (or people). But negatively, there must be a situation in which there is no existing practice to carry on if a choice is
not made.
This brings us to the second class of issues. It is typical of most
legislative situations. In the usual situation a law is either (1) a
revision, amendment or supplantation of an old law or (2) an entirely new course of action. In the former, if the proposed change
fails, the old law still exists and there is no intolerable unlawed-

'Of course, depending on the office, a vacancy is more or less tolerable
for a short period of time, e.g., a vacant senate seat will not prevent the Senate
from functioning, whereas a presidential vacancy is, for any length of time,
absolutely intolerable as manifested by the elaborate line of automatic succession.
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gap. In the latter, of course, we carry on as before. In short, this
second class of issues exists in any situation in which a choice is
not imperative, i.e., in whch an existing practice will continue if no
choice is made. This kind of choice can be characterized symbolically as the choice between '" and "not A', where "not A" is equivalent to existing practice. If "A" is chosen in this situation, existing
practice is changed. This change means that: (1) the will of the
people (the lawmaker) of an antecedent time is overridden and (2)
expectations built up under existing practice are lost. These two
factors make for a "presumption in favor of existing practice." 62
Note that neither of these factors was present in the first class of
"imperative choice" issues.
The justification for this presumption, if not obvious, is made
clear by two common sense questions. Since the existing practice is
some former lawmaker's choice or series of choices and we have
gotten along (even if we've only muddled through), and since such
former lawmaker may even have been almost as wise and reasonable as we are, had we not better think twice before we change?
Second, if the predictability of the legal consequences of voluntary
acts is of the essence of law, then, in so far as new law upsets reasonable prophecies based on existing practice (law), is it not to that
extent counter to the very idea of law? The most egregious form of
this upsetting of expectations is the ex post facto law. Retroactive
legislation of all sorts has been subjected to due process scrutiny
and often struck down.63 The judicial rule of stare decisis is also
predicated in part on not upsetting expectations. 4
Moreover, the whole idea of constitutional limitations and a
primary consideration in the governmental structure set up in constitutions are to force change in existing practice to be deliberate
02Alexander Bickel's phrase, but in slightly different context. Bickel, supra,

note 21 at 48.

'See generally Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislatiom, 75 HA v. L. REv. 692 (1960).
'Of course, the chief rationale for the doctrine is that courts make no law,

they only interpret it. This involuves first discovering, then announcing, the
controlling principles. But after the rule has been once announced, if no
"lawmaker" intervenes to change it, it is not changed and cannot be changed
because courts are without such power. But courts could (and sometimes do)
declare that the earlier announcement was wrong (compare Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) and would be more inclined to do this but for expectancies built up and
fear of loss of faith in the finality and principled nature of judicial decision
making.
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and slow. 5 The more fundamental the existing practice, the
more difficult it is to change - to the point where some rules are felt
by many to be so rooted in reason, tradition, or their idea of the
nature of governmental or societal relationships, as to be absolutely
immutable.66 Thus, constitutional limitations or their counterparts, constitutional rights, being thought generally to embody
fundamental norms, are made most difficult to change. 7 But ordinary legislation is also made more difficult to create than by simple
majority passange. Executive veto is almost universal practice. The
very idea of bicameralism was predicted on slowing down the
impetuousness of change by a simple majority of a single popular
chamber. Of course, one of the primary methods of protecting the
presumption in favor of existing practice is in requiring super-majorities or in allowing minority veto, which is the same thing.
If the super-majority requirement is thought of as a minority veto,
the contrast between the second (non-imperative) kind of choice
and the first (imperative) kind becomes obvious. A veto can only
be negation of a single alternative. It cannot be a choice between
two alternatives, for a veto is a choice between accepting and
rejecting a single alternative. Confusion may be caused by thinking

'James Madison, in defending the Senate's structure and role established
by the Constitution, stated:
[A]nd as the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the diseases
to which our governments are most liable [the Senate's role as an additional impediment against improper acts of legislation] . . . may be
more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of
all single impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced
by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 402-403 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (J. Madison).
"See, e.g., THE FEDxERxsr No. 78 (A Hamilton).
'See e.g., U. S. CONST. art. V.
Alexander Hamilton in defending the presidential veto stated:
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose
as well as to the other. But this objection will have little weight with
those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconsistancy and
mutability in the laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character
and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution
calculated to restrain the excess of lawmakers, and to keep things in
the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as
much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to
greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may
possibly be done by preventing a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
THE FEDERAusr No. 73, at 478 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton). See
Reynolds v. Sirs, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
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that "rejecting" is a second alternative, and in a way it is. But that
second alternative is existing practice.
A final illustration from another context, to sum up this discussion of "classes of issues" will also take us back to the "one man,
one vote" rule. Five people (of equal status) start on an auto trip
from Pittsburgh to New York, tacitly agreed upon (from previous
trips) route "A". On the trip several decisions might have to be
made. If route "A" is for some reason closed and two alternative
routes are open to continue the journey, then a simple majority
must control. If route "A" is open, but one person proposes a new
route and two others say they too would like the new route, while
two want no change, the minority travelers might protest that the
new route was contrary to the wishes of the group as expressed just
three hours before. They might also ask whether they were to be
subjected to the mercurial whims of a mere majority? In addition,
one dissenter complains he had relied on using route "A" as it was
shorter and he needed to be in New York by a certain time. The
more explicit he can show the original agreement to have been
(including any agreement as to how a change would be made) or
the greater his reliance on the original route, the more cogent is
his contention that the will of the two who desire no change should
prevail over the three who do. The decision would turn on many
factors (it would be a political type decision) but one could not
seriously contend that fundamental fairness required simple majority rule. If someone proposed during the trip that they go to
Baltimore instead of New York, a minority veto (even a single man
veto) would be plainly justified.
On tht other hand, a wholly differest order of question is involved if one of our five travelers was given two votes in whatever
decision was to be made. Such might be justified on the grounds
that he owned the car, was the driver, etc. Or someone else might
not be given any vote (because he was too young, didn't help buy
gasoline, etc.). This type of question can be put under the rubric
of relative participativepower and it is this order of question that
was resolved by the "one man, one vote" rule of Reynolds v. Sims.68
Before turning to a closer analysis of the apportionment cases,
a further word is in order on the type of issue that was before the
voters in Roane County on April 29, 1968, and which became the
-377 US. 533 (1964).
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subject of the lawsuit in Lance v. Board of Education."D Sections 4
and 8 of Article X of the Constitution of West Virginia place limitations on debt acquisition and on the level of property taxes of
local governmental units which are absolute in terms but subject to
temporary suspension (if acquired for school building purposes),
but only if three-fifths of the qualified voters (each having one vote,
of course) approve of such ad hoc suspension of the constitutional
limitation. Clearly, the constitutional limitation was the existing
practice and the vote was for a change from that practice. In this
situation, the condition for such change was expressedly agreed on
beforehand. The electors voted either for or against such change i.e., voted either for "A" or for "not A". It is analogous to our five
travelers having agreed on route "A" to New York but having also
agreed before they started that any deviation to route "B" must be
0
acceded to by four of the five travelers.7
The Lance election was of the change-in-existing-practice type
of issue. Moreover, it involved a change in an existing practice
thought so fundamental as to be enshrined in the state constitution.
Under those circumstances a three-fifths majority requirement was
clearly compatible with the concept of fairness thought fundamental
to a scheme of ordered liberty.
This somewhat overstates the case for the fairness of the threefifths majority rule in the circumstances of the Lance case. The
overstatement is caused by purposely oversimplifying the models
used above for analysis. What has been left out is the fact of modern
1170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).

"That is, in a dynamic, as opposed to a static society, there is a constant
need for new legislation, and the need is, of course, a function of the degree
of change. The more rapid and marked is the change, the greater is the felt
need for legislation (i.e., public problem-solving) to the point that in many instances and to a greater or lesser degree, an intolerable unlawed-gap is felt to
exist. Since this felt intolerability of existing practice is different with each
problem demanding legislative solution, the degree of felt fairness or unfairness of a minority veto on legislative change likewise varies with each problem.
The precise instances when any minority veto will be fair and the size of the
minority (e.g., 33%, 40%, 45%) that ideally should be allowed to block a
majority are almost impossible to predict. For example, the increasing use of
automobiles has created increasing demands for pollution control and new
highways; increasing urbanization has increased demands for slum eradication;
inflation, demands for fiscal control and higher taxes to meet increased costs;
affluence, demands for finaancial security, leisure time, better schools; etc. But
the demand varies with each problem and so does the solution.
Thus, the deliberate use of minority veto is limited almost exclusively to
to special situations like constitutional change, overriding executive veto, expulsion of legislative members, etc. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. V, art. I, § 7; art.
I, § 5.
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society's dynamic growth and change. Such change, of course, creates
many new problems - problems with which existing practice is simply unable to cope. The greater the problem, the more imperative
will be the felt need for solution. The point may be reached where
doing nothing about the problem is intolerable. Of course, when
that point is reached, the issue becomes similar to the imperative
choice type of issue even though the choice remains between "A"
and "not A". "Not A", or existing practice, is felt to be intolerable
by many in the community. Of course, if it is absolutely intolerable
in the sense used above, where, for instance, there would be no
president if a new one is not chosen, then presumably the entire
community would vote "A" and a percentage vote problem is obviated. In fact, if there is a broad consensus that solutions and the
choice would become one between alternative solutions rather than
between solution and no solution. A pure form of the imperative
kind of issue would then arise, i.e., a choice between "A" and "B".
Thus, legislative issues usually hover between pure imperative and
pure non-imperative type issues depending on the consensus about
the intolerableness of no solution to a problem. Of course, to
those individuals to whom "no solution" seems absolutely intolerable anything but simple majority vote seems fundamentally unfair. But again if "no solution" is really intolerable in the pure-imperative sense then the question of majorities will not arise - simple
majority rule will always be assumed as it always has been in imperative choice situations. The assumption is so fundamental one
does not even recognize it.
The degree of unfairness of a super-majority requirement is
a direct function of the degree of intolerability of "no solution" to
problems constantly arising in a changing society. Super-majority
requirements are thus not a very workable or satisfactory way of
checking too rapid change in existing practice. Probably because of
this, the universal general rule is simple majority in all but a few
kinds of legislative situations. Checking, as mentioned above, is
left to bicameralism, to executive veto, and to constitutionalizing
fundamentals. But primarily existing practice is protected by the
fairness inherent in the presumption in its favor which most lawmakers feel and are to that degree restrained.
In Lance, the plaintiffs and maybe even the court felt the rundown condition of the school system was intolerable and demanded solution. Thus, to them at least, the three-fifths majority require-
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ment seemed fundamentally unfair. To all people with strong convictions about the imperativeness of sound education, the power of
a minority to veto reform must seem like an issue of constitutional
dimensions. This is especially true in light of prevailing attitudes
toward constitutional rights, as taught by the Supreme Court. (This
"teaching"by the Court will be discussed in Part II.) For the reasons
stated above, the three-fifths rule was not fundamentally unfair in
the constitutional sense. Only one's convictions about education
make it seem so. Apparently such conviction was not shared by even
a simply majority of the people of the state.
But had the court explored the problem of when a minority
veto is and is not fundamentally fair, they would have been dealing
with whatever constitutional problem was raised by the complaint.
Analysis in terms of the "one man, one vote" rule was like using the
rules of arithmetic to teach spelling.
Unfortunately, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals did rely on the "one person, one vote" rule first announced
in Gray v. Sanders7' and further enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims72
in deciding the Lance case. The West Virginia court relied on the
following statement in Gray to bridge the gap between electing a
governor or legislature and voting in a referendum.
The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concern matters of representation, such as the allocation of Senators irrespective of population and the use of
3
electoral college in the choice of a president.T
Rather than helping the West Virginia court reach its result, this
passage should have alerted the court to the fact that the Supreme
Court does not think of super-majority requirements sanctioned by
the Constitution."4
Furthermore, the West Virginia court placed special reliance
on the following language in Reynolds v. Sims:
And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement
or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as wholly prohibiting the exercise of the franchise.75
Although this idea of "dilution of weight" was explained above
as only a way of talking about the "one man, one vote" rule in a
"372 U.S. 568 (1963).
7377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963)
"U.S. CONST.

(emphasis added).

art. I § § 3,5 and 7; art II, § 2; art. V.

"377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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context of simple majority, a somewhat fuller statement of the
purport of the "one man, one vote" rule may make dear why it is
inapposite to the super-majority situation.
The "One Man, One Vote" Rule
A plethora of articles has been written explaining, expanding

and criticizing the reapportionment cases. 7 It will be sufficient
here to set forth in rather stark terms what the "one man, one vote"

rule means, based on the facts, holdings and talk of the cases. No
criticism of the rule is here attempted.
The "one man, one vote" rule is deceptively simple, not because it does not mean exactly what common sense tells us it means,
but rather because it does. But if it does, why all the fuss, since

everyone in an equalitarian democracy like ours agrees that nobody should get more or less vote than anyone else, and in direct

elections this is the rule that universally obtains.77 It is only in in"0E.g., Auerbach. The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One
Vote, One Value, 1964, SuPRtEM CouRT REvIEW 1; Edwards, supra note 21; Reapportionment Symposium (Dixon, Kauper, McKay) 63 Mier. L. R.v. 20 )
(1964); Sickes, Dragons, Bacon Strips and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment, 75 YALE L. J. 1300 (1966); Schwartzberg, Reapportionment Gerrymanders, and the Nation of "Compactness," 50 MINN. L. REv. 433 (1966).
"In some recent cases the Supreme Court has struck down the denial -of the
right of a citizen to participate in local elections. Kramer v. Union Free School Dirtrict No. 15, 395 US. 621 (1969) (school board election) and Cipriano v. City
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (election for issuance of revenue bonds by
municipal utility). These are, of course, pure voting rights cases in the sense of
Carrington v. Rash, 380 US. 89 (1965); and see cases collected in Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964). That is, the right of certain citizens to participate in an election was absolutely denied. The absolute denial of the right to
participate in the election, i.e., to vote, has been, as far as my research discloses.
the only way the right to vote has been abridged in any direct election. I know
of no instances where in a direct election some voters are given two or three votes
or only a half a vote. Only in cases like Lance where simple majority rule is
assumed to be the only fair method of determining the outcome of any election
does the weighting of votes appear to obtain in a direct election. Even there,
however, it was the choice made that was weighted, and not the right to
choose. Everyone in Roane County had exactly the same right to choose, i.e.
to participate in the election. Some confusion is apparently engendered -by
the dual meaning of the word "vote." It means in common usage both the
"right to choose" and the "choice made." In voting rights and reapportionment
cases, the right to vote has meant only the "right to choose." If one's vote is
not counted or is counted less than others, on whichever side it is cast, then
the "right to choose" is Violated. But some confusion may be caused by the fact
that the incident of such violation comes after the choice has been made. See
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 38S (1915) (conspiracy by election officials
not to count the votes of certain precincts). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 555 (1964). The "vote" as the "choice made" was entirely irrelevant in
those cases.
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direct elections that the rule has not universally obtained and in fact
was, until Baker v. Carr, flagrantly violated by most states.
An indirect election is one in which the thing immediately
voted on is not the thing ultimately voted for. The most familiar
example is the balloting for President of the United States. The
thing ultimately voted for is the President. The thing immediately
voted on is the way one's state's electoral votes will be cast. Originally this latter fact was more dearly recognized because one voted
for a slate of electors who had some discretion in casting their votes
for the presidency. The gradual process of democratization (and
the party system) has made the electors, de facto, pure reflectors.' s
They are now in practice exactly like the de jure pure reflectors in
the county unit vote system involved in Gray. In the latter case, one
voted for the way one's county's allotment of votes would be cast
in the ultimate election of a gubernatorial nominee. Since the
county votes are pure reflectors, a voter feels he is voting for the
ultimate thing when actually he is voting for the way the county
unit vote will be cast. The same is true of presidential elections.
Thus any distortion between the immediate vote and the thing
ul.timately elected is quite palpable in these simple indirect
elections.
'In indirect elections of the pure reflector variety there are two
kinds of distortion. First, since the "reflector votes" are voted for by
groups of people, any inequality in the ratios of reflectors to numbers of people in the groups electing such reflectors will distort the
result from what it would have been in a direct election. For example, if group A of fifty people gets one vote, group B of two
hundred get two votes, and group C of three hundred people gets

"At this point, a brief lexicon of the terms used here to describe the
phenomenon of indirect election is in order: A reflector is the medium through
which the original vote is translated into the final result (a mirror, not a
thinker); a pure reflector is one which is both "mere" and "simple"; a mere
reflector is one which only reflects and has no capacity to exercise intervening
judgment and should be contrasted with; a trustee reflector which has capacity
to exercise its own judgment in reflecting the voter's will; a simple reflector is
one which reflects only the vote as originally cast (really a reflector vote) and
should be contrasted with; a complex reflector which reflects the will of the
voters over a period of time and through a complex of means (a reflector
voter); a simple indirect election is one in which the reflector is "pure"; a complex indirect election is one in which the reflector is either "complex4 or
"trustee" or both; a pure trustee is not a reflector but rather a legislative agent
free to exercise his own will as to what is best for the entire polity he legislates
for.
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two votes in the common election of the governor, then obviously
votes reflecting two-hundred and fifty people can elect the governor
despite the casting of the votes reflecting three hundred voters for
the other candidate. This is the distortion of unequal apportionment.

.. I

Second, since the "reflector votes" are usually allotted according to the total number of people (or voters) in a unit, one "reflector
vote" in effect represents (reflects) both those for and against the
way such vote will ultimately be cast. Taking, for example the same
groups as above: in groups A, 26 vote for the X candidate reflector
vote and 24 for the Y candidate reflector vote; in group B, 101 vote
for Z, 99 for Y; in group C, zero vote for X and 300 for Y. Thus
three unit votes will be cast for X and two for Y, but only 127 people.
voted for X and while 423 voted for Y. This is the distortion for
unit voting.

Since the votes ultimately cast are pure reflections of the original voters and these voters are felt to be the ones actually electing
the ultimate thing, the distortion is palpable and the unfairness of
the system is patent. Thus we have the Gray decision and the present movement for direct election of the President.
Now, the indirect election involved in legislative apportionment cases is both more difficult to see and inherently less distortive. Thus these cases are much more controversial. The reason the
election of legislative representatives is actually an indirect election
is that what one is ultimately voting for is, to put it baldly, the legislation that will come out of the legislature and neither the individual legislator voted nor the body of legislators! The reason
such an indirect election is less distortive than the pure reflector
unit system is that representatives, not being simple reflectors or
mere reflectors, in exercising their legislative judgement on any
particular legislation before them can consider the interests of Al
those whom they represent - those who voted against as well as for
them. Moreover, since the basis of allocating representation. is
population, not voters, 79 they represent those who did not or could
not vote. The unit rule distortion is thus mitigated s°
"See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 90-95 (1966).

Oln cases in which equal apportionment has been ordered, Justice Stewart in dissent has urged that the continuing presence of unit rule distortiori

makes unrealistic, and ultimately futile and meaningless, the whole effort to
reapportion on a strict mathematical basis. Lucas v. Colorado General Assem-
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However, because representatives have increasingly come to be
thought of essentially as reflectors of the will of their constituents,
the proposition is true that the thing ultimately voted for in a
representative election is legislation. Although essentially reflectors,
legislative representatives are not pure reflectors for two reasons:
(1) they cannot be simple reflectors; and, (2) they are not supposed
to be mere reflectors. First, they cannot be simple reflectors (in the
Gray sense) because the specific legislation the legislators will ultimately vote on is not usually before the voters. Second, they are not
supposed to be mere reflectors, because no legislator is compelled
to vote only the way the people whom he represents want him to
vote - even if he could know how "they" want him to vote. Besides
the fact that, once elected, a representative looks as much to the
next election as the last, he is also expected to be a trustee as well as

bly. 377 US. 713, 744, 750 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Neal, sufra note
20-at 217. But what is assumed explicitly by Justice Stewart and implicitly by
Dean Neal is that "[legislators] represent people, or, more accurately, a majority
of the voters in their districts... . Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, supra
at 750. As is pointed out below, the proposition that the representative repre.
sents only those who voted for him simply cannot be true. In a way, this is seeing
representative elections as an indirect election of the legislature, and not of its
legislation. (Neal's words "[allow] one-fourth of the total voting population, ...
to control the legislature)." Neal, supra, note 20 at 217 (emphasis added). Viewed-that way, proportional representation would be the better system for assuring an accurate translation of popular elections into representative bodies. But
viewing the matter as if the legislature is being indirectly elected (i.e., the body
of legislators being viewed as a monolith) is erroneous for such view is inconsistent with the idea of a representative as a delegate of all the people in his
district; moreover, "to control the legislature" in the Neal sense could only
mean "to control who the individual members will be" whereas the important
control is over their activity while assembled. The latter control is much more
complex than control over their mere election. Commentators like Professor
Auerbach counter the Stewart criticism by asserting (1)the unit rule distortion
is not as an empirical reality very great, (2) eliminating half the evil is better
than eliminating none, and (3) proportional representation has its own attendant evils. Auerbach, supra note 76 at 31-35.
That is not the reply to Stewart that evolves out of the analysis made by this
article, which is that legislation, not legislatures, are elected indirectly, and
law-making is an on-going, complex process allowing all members of the
constituent districts to have a voice in the individual legislative vote of their
representative. It is true, however, that through this analysis one sees that unit
rule distortion is only mitigated, not eliminated, because the initial vote to
elect a representative still is a strong control (one among others) of the elected
representative's future legislative votes. But proportional representation, with
its many parties and coalition governments, has long been rejected in AngloAmeriacn political theory, and any unit rule distortion caused by constituent
districts is outweighed by the evils of the alternative.
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a delegate (mere reflector) - i.e., to exercise his own judgment as
to the interests of all his constituents as well as reflect their judgment or carry out their mandate.81
Thus the ultimate vote for legislation, which is the aim of the
preliminary vote for a representative, is a dynamic, complex process of reflection which begins with the actual election of a representative. This election is at least partly based on current issues - i.e.,
on the candidate's declaration as to how he will vote on prospective
legislative issues. Once the representative is in the legislature then
he is controlled through his constituent's various manifestations of
their desires with reelection as their lever for compliance. Moreover,
he continually uses his individual judgment as to their interest for
which judgment he was in part elected, but again with reelection as
the ultimate sanction on such judgment. In short, when one
votes on a representative one votes for that man whom he feels-all
things considered-will most probably vote for those laws which he
would himself vote for, given the representative's special knowledge
and expertise.
The foregoing can be labeled the 'essentially reflective' theory
of representative democracy, more commonly, though somewhat
misleadingly, called the delegate theory. Note that the trustee aspect
of the representative's role described above was limited to the
representative's judging his own constituents' best interests. He was
to be, if you'll excuse the surface anomaly, a trustee-reflector.
There has long been a debate over whether representatives
are essentially trustees - entrusted with the power to exercise their
own judgment as to what is best for the whole polity, or essentially
delegates (to use the phrase more familar than "reflector"), authorized to exercise their own judgment only to determine what the
most likely judgment of their constituents would be on any issue.82
One elects a trustee because one trusts his judgment, a delegate because he can be trusted to vote his constitutent's judgment. Representatives are thought to be both but with emphasis shifting from
83
one theory to the other over time.
Now, when the emphasis shifts to representatives-as-pure-delegates there is a concomitant shift to thinking of legislatures merely

"8See Auerbach, supra note 76 at 56-57, and authorities therein cited.
'See Edwards, supra note 21 at 1272-73 and empirical studies therein cited.'
1id.
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as organs for expressing the will of the people - to the extreme point
of thinking that there is an identity between legislative will and
popular will. Theoretically when that point is reached, a perfect indirect election situation obtains. Perfect indirect elections are
ones in which the intermediate vote is reflective only (though
through dynamic complex reflection) - and they demand "one
man, one vote" as the only fair rule of apportionment.
On the other hand, the emphasis on representatives-as-trustees
produces a concomitant emphasis on legislatures as bodies of
aristocrats governing the polity with their collective and deliberative wisdom. The will of the legislature is a thing apart from the
will of the people (but not, of course, necessarily or even usually
opposed to such will). In the representative as pure trustee theory,
the indirect election concept does not obtain, and therefore the
"one man, one vote" formulation of the pure population basis
for apportionment simply makes no sense.
Population is not, however, irrelevant as a criterion for apportionment but great precision in equality is unnecessary and too
simplistic. It is unnecessary since the elected trustee is not going to
reflect his constituents' will, he is going to join with others to govern
the whole polity. The election is merely a method of selecting the
best man of the polity by districts instead of at large.
Such precision is too simplistic because county (or any
political subunit) integrity should be maintained and a broad
geographical distribution of trustees aimed for in order that there
be representative trustees in all parts of the polity to keep the deliberative body informed of the broad range of problems. It is assumed that the deliberative body of trustees will use such informing
voice only to determine what is best for the whole polity and the
informing trustee will not necessarily vote his district's interest, but
vote the broader interest of all the people. Population is not entirely irrelevant since the more populous areas are both more likely to
have more people of trustee quality (just statistically and to have
more problems since people are the source of some governmental
problems) about which the deliberative body needs an informing
voice. But the essential point remains that in the representative-aspure-trustee scheme, population is not paramount.
It was a position between these two polar theories of representative government that the Supreme Court was forced to choose
when in Baker v. Carrit decided to settle the dispute over legislative
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apportionment. This was what Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with his
4
usual perspicacity, predicted in his dissent in Baker v. Car.
Whether the court knew it would need to make such choice one
cannot determine. In fact, whether or not the justices now know
they have much such choice is not determinable from their opinions.
What can be determined is this: many (in fact most) state
apportionment schemes had through neglect or abusive use of
entrenched power, ignored population in apportionment to an
unconscionable extent even under a pure trustee theory of representation. However, if any argument could be made that the states'
unequal apportionment reflected rational policy (the Court in
Reynolds said it reflected "no policy") the argument had to be
that the apportionment was predicated on an extreme form of
representation as pure trusteeship. At the same time the representatives neither acted like pure trustees nor were expected to. In fact,
if anything our democracy had moved radically in the other direction. 5
Enter the Supreme Court, determined to break the unconscionable legislative impasse. Being a court and federal, it had to find
a justiciably manageable standard (i.e., a simple one) for determining which legislative apportionments were so unconscionable as to
be unconstitutional. Moreover, it had to find a rule having generality and neutrality. Being a constitutional rule, it had to embody
an ideal of almost immutable fundamentalness. Thus with the
imperatives86 of simplicity, generality, neutrality and fundamentalness, the court moved inexorably from Baker to "one man, one vote"
as that standard. Passing through Gray v. Sanders made it easier
since that case involved a purely reflective or simple indirect election. But at the same time the court chose, consciously or not, a
position on the extreme delegate or reflective end of the spectrum
of theories of representative government. As was pointed out, at
least this theory is more compatible with notions of what our
democracy has become than the trustee theory viz.: the remarkable
extent to which the Court has gotten compliance with decrees

-869 U.S. 186, 800 (1962).
'rhis is more fully discussed in Part II of this article.
'The imperatives of judicial constitutional decision-making are discussed in
Part II under the rubric of the "legitimate rule of judicial review in a democracy.,
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which were essentially unenforceable without willing (if verbally
87
grudging) cooperation from the state legislatures.
Why has the Court not expressly stated that it has chosen
a standard for resolution of apportionment cases which necessarily
implies viewing the whole representative process as an indirect
election of legislation by the people? The answer is fairly plain: (1)
If "one man, one vote" implies "indirect election" and "indirect
election" implies a distinct theory of representative government
then the choice of "one man, one vote" implies the choice of a
distinct theory of representative government. The latter choice is
obviously a Guarantee Clause decision and the Court has persisted
in maintaining that such decisions are beyond its competency.
(2) Because of initial standing and justiciability problems the
court adopted the rhetoric of "equal protection" and "voting"
cases. The Court may have become so involved with such rhetoric
that it was simply blinded to the implications of its decisions.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the opinion of the Court comes closest
to explicitly asserting that the thing ultimately voted for in electing
representatives is legislation, with these words:
But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the
people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right
to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies.88
Another place the Court refers to "an individual citizen's ability
to exercise an effective voice in the only instrument of state government directly representative of the people .... ."89 It also quotes
Jefferson as saying "a government is republican in proportion as
every member composing it has equal voice in the direction of its
concern ... "90
But aside from these references most of the opinion "talks" as
if the "one man, one vote" rule applied only to the immediate
election of the individual representatives, and as such demands
equal population districtsY' This is patently absurd. Manifestly in
87McCloskey, supra note 21 at 56-57. Professor McCloskey refers to the
court's apparently having hit upon "a latent consensus" of the public.

'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (emphasis added).

1id. at 576 (emphasis added).
"'Id. at 573 n. 53 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 555, 559, 560, 562, 563, 565, 566.
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voting for the district representative all "one man, one vote" demands is that each eligible voter get one vote. That standard is
and has been universally obeyed in such elections from time immemorial. The only way a "one man, one vote" rule makes sense as
a demand for equal population districts is if the election is viewed as an indirect election for legislation. The "one man, one vote"
rule when translated into its reapportionment form reads: each
citizen is, through the representative process, to have an equal right
to participate with each other citizen in the formation of those
laws which he must obey.
In a direct election like that involved in Lance v. Board of
Education" substitute "eligible voter" for "citizen" and strike out
"through the representative process". It is manifest that in the
election in Lance the rule was obeyed. Every eligible voter of Roane
County had the exact same right to participate in the voting on the
tax levy as every other eligible voter. Each took one vote into the
voting booth. Each had his counted as one. Only if one assumes
simple-majority as the only permissible margin for decision do the
votes appear to be counted differently. But, of course the thing
assumed is the whole issue to be decided.
Perhaps the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should
have discovered on their own that they were blazing an entirely
new trail through the "political thicket" - Judge Haymond's dissent certainly reveals that he was aware of this. Moreover, the
court had to know that the respondent, Board of Education, and
its attorney did not have sufficient adversity of interest, to motivate
the laborious effort of fully and persuasively articulating the
opposition case. But something more than mere inadvertence or negligence must explain why four careful and responsible judges
could have been as wrong93 as they were in Lance v. Board of
Education. That something more is the example set by the United
States Supreme Court. The example of taking cases that are not
"cases" in the traditional sense; of taking cases for reasons that on
their facts must appear to the uninitiated at least to be merely the
assumption that every wrong must have a remedy whether judicially appropriate or not; for declaring rights that in the stark form
9170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
"I use "wrong" not because the decision was unwise (though I think it was)
or generally untenable (though I think it was that, too) but because the court
relied on cases that logically did not support its position.
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of a holding must appear to be mere judicial fiat no matter what
gloss of history, precedent or fundamental morality is put on it by
lengthy opinion unread by a few and even that usually neutralized
by dissent; and by not limiting such holdings with other holdings
but allowing loose, confusing and sometimes contradictory language
to draw the new line. This "bad example" is not large by actual
number of incidences but rather appears large because the
Court's example is so visible that every tendency is magnified by
discussion, by speculation and by reformer's hope. Such reformer's
hope would be better used if turned to persuasion in the political arena - to that arduous, painstaking process of articulating, explaining, reasoning and ultimately convincing the People. Of course
this still goes on, but to some extent is dampened by the hope
(largely false in the long run) of judicial intervention and court
solution.
To enlarge and explain this hypothesis, I will in Part II set
forth my view (largely borrowed from others) of the legitimate role
of judicial review in a democracy; cite specific examples of the
court's deviation from such role; explain, with examples, how this
has had a deleterious effect on our democracy; and finally, to make
some modest proposals for change.
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